Adopt Quantum Safely

QURISK>

Quantum Technologies Cyber Threat over Encryption Protocols & Mitigation Options

FRnOG 38 – 06/10/2023

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AGENDA

- Introduction to Quantum Technologies
- Understand the Quantum Cyber Threat
- **Quantum-based Mitigation Options**
- **Quantum-proof Mitigation Options**
- **W** Timeline(s) & Regulations
- PQC Migration Roadmap



Introduction to Quantum Technologies



When we harness Quantum Mechanics properties...

...to enhance today's Technologies...





...we get Quantum Technologies:





Insight on Quantum Computing



	D1 SCALABLE SYSTEM	D2 INITIALIZATION	D3 MEASUREMENT	D4 UNIVERSAL GATES	D5 COHERENCE	D6 INTERCONVERSION	D7 COMMUNICATION
SiGe Quantum Dots							
Doped Silicon							
NV Centers							
Neutral Atoms							
Trapped lons							
Superconductors							

Sufficient demonstrations exist to proceed to the 100 qubit level

Concepts and/or first demonstrations exist

No realistic concepts yet developed





Source: MITxPRO



2020

Quantum Computing Applications





Understand the Quantum Cyber Threat



Quantum Computing Threat on Cyber-Cryptography





How to break RSA encryption?



Shor's Algorithm at work

Quantum-based Mitigation Options (Quantum Communication)

Quantum Key Distribution (QkD)

Quantum key distribution (QKD):

- secure communication method for exchanging encryption keys only known between shared parties;
- based on properties found in quantum physics;
- uses a quantum system to protect the data, rather than relying on mathematics.

Advantage: The no-cloning theorem states that it is impossible to create identical copies of an unknown quantum state, which prevents attackers from simply copying the data in the same manner that they can copy network traffic today. Additionally, if an attacker disturbs or looks at the system, the system will change in such a way that the intended parties involved will know.

Challenges & Promises of Quantum Communication

PROMISES entanglement with Alice in a 'memory Communication gubit qubit' while his other qubit establishes Charli entanglement with Charlie. Long-distance entanglement Lab 1 A photon is funnelled through an optical fibre and delivered to another device to establish an Alice entanglement. Lab 2 onature **Quantum Internet**

Quantum-proof Mitigation Options (Post-Quantum Cryptography)

NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative

National Institute of Standards and Technology Evaluate, and standardize one or more quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms

- 5 years ago NIST initiated a project seeking "to solicit, evaluate, and standardize one or more quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms."
- Currently in fourth round
- Even if one of NIST 'finalist' solutions is fully developed, tested and proven effective, it can never be fool-proof.

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"We have no absolute guarantee of security for any cryptosystem. The best we can say is that after a lot of study by a lot of smart people, nobody has found any cracks." —Dustin Moody, NIST

Public-Key Encryption/KEMs	Digital Signatures	
CRYSTALS-Kyber	CRYSTALS-Dilithium	
	Falcon	
	SPHINCS ⁺	

Challenges of PQC Migration

Timeline(s) & Regulations

Forecast & Migration Timelines

Exhibit 1 - The Time Window for Upgrading Cryptographic Infrastructure Is Closing Rapidly

Sources: NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography timeline, BCG analysis.

Note: PQC: Post-Quantum Cryptography. NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology USA.

¹Based on NIST PQC timeline.

²Public Key Cryptography (up to RSA-2048).

Experts' estimates for the likelihood of a quantum computer able to break RSA-2048 in 24 hours - Comparison of yearly surveys

Acknowledging the immaturity of PQC is important: ANSSI will not endorse any direct drop-in replacement of currently used algorithms in the short/medium term. However, this immaturity should not serve as an argument for postponing the deployments. ANSSI encourages all industries to initiate in the next months a gradual overlap transition in order to progressively increase trust on the post-quantum algorithms and their implementations while ensuring no security regression as far as classical (pre-quantum) security is concerned.

What is the recommended post-quantum transition roadmap?

To support a gradual transition, ANSSI encourages the following 3-phase roadmap (see below for a detailed description):

- Phase 1 (today): hybridation to provide some additional post-quantum defense-in-depth to the prequantum security assurance.
- Phase 2 (not earlier than 2025): hybridation to provide *post-quantum security assurance* while avoiding any pre-quantum security regression.
- Phase 3 (probably not earlier than 2030): optional standalone post-quantum cryptography.

ANSSI, January 4, 2022

https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/publication/anssi-views-on-the-post-quantum-cryptography-transition/

Update on ANSSI views about PQC Transition - 2023

This document is an update of ANSSI's position on the post-quantum cryptography transition in view of the recent advances in the topic. It should be read as an addendum to 2022's publication [1]. We will detail our recommendations in terms of post-quantum algorithms and hybridation techniques.

ANSSI also decided to speed-up the original agenda. First French security visas for products implementing hybrid post-quantum cryptography are expected to be delivered around 2024-2025.

- 1. It is important to avoid modifying the parameters of the standardized instance.
- The parameters are defined for several minimum security levels. We recommend to use the highest NIST security level as possible, preferably level-5 (i.e. equivalent to AES-256) or level-3 (i.e. equivalent to AES-192).
- 3. We recommend to use ephemeral keys as much as possible. The systematic use of ephemeral private keys allows to prevent many attacks like decryption failures ones.
- 4. We also recommend to use the actively secure version (IND-CCA) that will be standardized by NIST. There are some cases, like in provable authenticated protocols, where the passively secure (IND-CPA) version in static or ephemeral mode may still be secure. But an extra care must then be paid to make sure that no decryption oracle is available under any circumstance even in the case of side-channel attacks.

ANSSI, August 29, 2023 https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2023/09/follow_up_position_paper_on_post_quantum_cryptography.pdf

PQC Migration Roadmap

Roadmap to Quantum-Resistant Cryptography

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